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This paper explores the relationship between manufacturing and growth rate in recent 
years. We undertake a simple cross-country analysis using UN data. When controlling for 
variables relevant to growth, we find no significant relationship between the two variables. 
We argue that manufacturing protectionism cannot be rationalized by the data for this time 
period. Then, we look at developed countries like the United States and find that whereas a 
positive relationship between 10 year forward GDP growth and manufacturing was likely 
present in the 1970’s, the same relationship does not hold today. Our findings shed light on 
recent debates over protectionism. 




“Emotional arguments over protectionism today harken back to the second half of the 
eighteenth  century,  when  Physiocracy,  the  philosophy  that  ‘only  the  farmer  really  made 
something out of more or less nothing’ was popular.  The Physiocrats thus reasoned that 
manufacturing was unlikely to benefit an economy. Similarly, today, our gut reaction to the 
closing down of a factory is that we are allowing a central part of our economy to perish.” 
(Gopnik, 2010).  Like the farms of the Physiocrats, manufacturing is a tangible symbol of a 
country’s prosperity. We show in this paper that all of us need to be careful not to overstate 
its importance. 
 
The Economist (2011) assessed that the belief in the importance of manufacturing, 
what some have named “manufacturing fetishism,” is so important that it hosted an online 
debate on the proposition: “This House Believes that an Economy Cannot Succeed Without 
A Big Manufacturing Base.” Cambridge University’s Ha-Joon Chang argued in favour of the 
proposition  against  Columbia’s  Jagdish  Bhagwati.  Chang  won  the  debate  76%  to  24% 
according  to the  readers’  vote. In  the  process  of  the  debate, the  share  of  manufacturing 
fetishists fell from 80% to 76%. So while Bhagwati did not win the debate, he shrank the 
proportion of manufacturing fetishists. These numbers illustrate the sway of manufacturing 
fetishists.  
 
There is an alternative way to pick the winner. 95 comments were submitted from the 
floor by readers after  introductory remarks  by the chief protagonists. 53 comments were 
submitted after the debate was over. We counted the votes implied in the comments. We 
dropped  all  but  one  comment  when  multiple  comments  were  submitted  by  the  same 
contributor, and we dropped comments that did not take a side. After the opening remarks, 
the vote was 44 for Chang and 35 for Bhagwati, with Chang winning by 66% to 44%, The 
comments submitted after the closing statements voted 13 for Chang and 16 for Bhagwati 
with  Chang  collecting  44%  to  Bhagwati’s  55%.  Our  assessments  of  these  comments  is 
admittedly subjective, but free of intentional bias. Sometimes a decision was hard to call, for 
example when a commenter remarked that for most countries manufacturing is essential but 
for some it is not. The discrepancy between the two ways of measuring who won leads us to 
conclude that the contributors who evaluated the debate carefully enough to comment were 
less pro manufacturing than those voters who just reflexly clicked the “vote yes” or “vote no” 
buttons on their computer screens. 
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At  its  simplest  level,  the  modern-day  protectionist  argument  assumes  that 
manufacturing is central to an economy. Hence, the logic goes, capital goods and knowledge 
accumulation in manufacturing is a tried and true recipe for growth. Moreover, concerns over 
structural unemployment and national security are used to argue that countries must keep 
manufacturing within their borders, and prevent offshore outsourcing. 
 
In Part 1 of this paper, we seek to address the simple and crucial assumption that 
manufacturing value added share of gross domestic product (GDP) propels economic growth. 
Our motivation for addressing this assumption is that it is often used as a justification for 
protectionist measures such as tariffs and subsidies, which cause costly economic distortions. 
This  part  is  an  attempt  to  rationalize  the  protectionist  assumption  with  cross-country 
empirical data. 
 
In Part 2 of this paper, we  limit our study to the  most developed economies  and 
examine  the  relationship  over  time  that  share  of  labour  in  manufacturing  has  on  future 
economic growth. We will show that care should be taken not to overstate the desirability of 
a high manufacturing share for the economies of developed countries, especially in today's 
globalized economy. 
 
In  Part  3  we  ask  whether  greater  government  effectiveness  raises  the  share  of 
manufacturing in GNP. We find an economically strong and statistically significant positive 
relationship. Thus, we conclude that manufacturing can be promoted by either protectionism 
or  better  governance.  The  choice?  Better  governance  raises  economic  efficiency  while 
protectionism lowers it. 
 
1.  Does Manufacturing Share of GDP Propel Economic Growth?:  
A Sample of All countries 
  In this part, we use crossplots and two econometric models to analyse the relationship 
between manufacturing share of GDP and average growth rate of per capita GDP. We find 
that there is no conclusive evidence to support the claim that manufacturing enhances growth 






We start our study with the year 1996, and study the impact of manufacturing share of 
GDP on the growth rate of per capita GDP between the years of 1996 and 2009. We chose 
1996  because  that  was  the  earliest  date  for  which  the  World  Bank  publishes  its  world 
governance indicator “government effectiveness,” which plays an important role as a variable 
in our model. For robustness, we also investigate the year 1998, which was the second year 




Our  manufacturing  data  comes  from  the  United  Nations  National  Accounts 
Aggregates  database  (UNNAAD).  The  UNNAAD  divides  a  country’s  GDP  into  various 
categories, one of which is called Manufacturing ISIC D, which is what we use. The dataset 
has fewer missing records than the other manufacturing dataset available. The dataset covers 5 
 
the time  period  from  1970  to  2009.  It  includes  GDP  components  data  from  all  216  UN 
member countries. 
 
The UNNAAD defines manufacturing as any process that transforms raw materials 
into new products. It should be noted however, that the classification of economic activities 
based on this definition can be ambiguous, and can lead to somewhat arbitrary distinctions 
between what is deemed a manufacturing activity or not. For example, activities like tyre 
retreading and wood preserving are included in the ISIC D, whereas the breakdown of bulk 
raw materials and subsequent bottling and packaging thereof is not included in the ISIC D 
(United Nations Statistics Division, 2011).  
 
When using this data, it is also important to acknowledge that many manufacturing 
companies either contract out services or have “evolved” into service providers. For example, 
Neely’s (2011) found that roughly 30% of firms studied provided both manufacturing and 
services. Only about 2% were pure manufacturing firms. An example of this trend is IBM, 
which was once a manufacturing firm, but reinvented itself as a service firm. “Servitisation” 
might obscure our analysis because it is more prevalent in developed countries, and therefore 




  Our GDP data also comes  from the  United Nations National  Account Aggregates 
database. We selected a GDP dataset from the same source because we assume that any 
systematic biases in calculating GDP will also be prevalent in the data for Manufacturing 
ISIC D, so our calculations of the share of GDP that manufacturing represents will be as 
accurate as possible. The GDP data covers a time period between 1970 and 2009, for the 
same countries as the Manufacturing ISIC D data. Both manufacturing output and GDP are 




  We use the World Bank’s (January 2011) government effectiveness point estimator 
for  our  governance  variable.  This  is  a  composite  of  perceptions  of  various  aspects  of 
governance: “the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its  independence  from  political  pressures,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (World 
Bank, January 2011, p.5).  The estimator is calculated from surveys of thousands of informed 
stakeholders, including policy experts, households, firms, and NGOs. We use this variable as 




Additionally,  we  use  two  indicators  from  the  World  Bank’s  World  Development 
Indicators dataset: population and percent of  labour force with  secondary  education.  The 
WDI population data  is complete for all  members of the United Nations. The percent of 
labour force with secondary education indicator was chosen because we needed a proxy for 





  Some  of  our  data  sets  suffer  from  omitted  values  for  certain  countries.  We  are 
concerned that the missing values could be systematic (e.g. data could be missing for poorer 
or  more  volatile  countries,  thus  skewing  our  results).  For  this  reason,  we  decided  to 
investigate two models, one for which few values were missing (Model I), and one for which 
more values were missing (Model II). In Model II, we make the trade off between relevant 





  We perform a simple regression of average geometric per capita growth rate from 
1996-2009  inclusive  on  the  manufacturing  share  of  GDP  in  1996.  These  are  annualized 
growth rates. They are calculated as: 
 




To convert to growth rates of real GDP per capita one must subtract the geometric average 
inflation over the period. This figure is 2.18% per year.  
 




where growth rates and inflation rates are expressed as proportional change per year. 
 
The regression is based on the results from 216 countries. We see in the chart below that the 
expected strong positive linear relationship between these two variables is not apparent. The 
regression p-value is .73, indicating that manufacturing share of GDP is not a significant 
explanatory variable for manufacturing share of 1996 GDP.
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Figure 1. GDP Growth for 1996-2009 as explained by manufacturing share in GDP 
(1996) 
                                                 
1 See Figure I of appendix for regression details. The appendix is available from Waite (alecia.waite@duke.edu) 
upon request. The p-value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as the one that was 
actually observed, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. The country with the highest growth rate (just under 
35% per year) is Equatorial Guinea. This growth rate seemed too good to be true. We double checked this entry 
with an additional data source and it is correct. 7 
 
 
  The advantage of a simple “uncontrolled” regression is that, because we are not tied 
down by availability of governance data (which starts in 1996), we can perform this analysis 
for a longer time interval.  We construct a cross plot of average geometric per capita GDP 
growth  rate  for  the  years  1970-2009  below,  with  a  similar  conclusion,  except  here 
manufacturing share negatively affects the estimated growth rate,
2 (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP growth for 1979-2009 as explained by manufacturing share in GDP 
(1970) 
                                                 




Model I: three independent variables 
 
In Model I, we control for level of development and governance: 
 
Where: 
•  is the compound annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the country for 
the years from 1996-2009 
•   is the manufacturing value added share of the country’s total GDP in 
1996 
•   is the World Bank’s governance effectiveness point estimator 
•  is the logarithm of the UN’s per capita GDP in current USD in the initial 
year. We included  to account for possible convergence effects. Additionally, 
when we control for   we acknowledge that manufacturing’s effect on growth 
rate may depend on level of economic development.  
The regression is based on the results from 146 countries. Countries were excluded from 
the regression if their values were missing from either the United Nations’ or the World 
Bank’s databases for these variables.
3 
 
                                                 
3 There is a high probability of systematic exclusion. Many of the countries for which we lack government 
effectiveness data are developing countries. 9 
 
When we analyze the effects of manufacturing value added share of GDP in 1996 on 
the average geometric growth rate, we see that when we control for per capita GDP in 1996 
and  for government effectiveness,  we have a statistically  insignificant beta coefficient on 
manufacturing value added share of GDP (p value of .79).
4 Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is a mere .0125, which indicates that if manshare does affect growth, it does so in 
a very small way. We find no conclusive evidence that manufacturing value added share of 
GDP in 1996 has a significantly positive effect on growth rate for the years 1996-2009.
5 We 
also run a robustness check using the same model with 1998 as our initial year, because 1998 
was the second year for which our government effectiveness data was available. Since the p-
value is .33, we find no significant relationship.
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A further robustness check uses 1996 as the starting year, but used the average of 
available years for all other variables. This approach has pros and cons. On the one hand, our 
result is not biased towards any one year. On the other hand, we can make less of a case for 
causation when we do this, because we are using observations from later years to explain 
growth rate over the entire period 1996-2009. Furthermore, years 1997 and 1999 are missing 
for our governance proxy, so that variable is biased towards later years. For this robustness 
check, we find no significant relationship.
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Model II: five independent variables 
 
It could be argued that more variables are necessary to explain growth. Growth is 
generally  taken  to  be  a  function  of  investment  in  physical  capital,  investment  in  human 
capital, population growth rate, and other factors like governance. To investigate the merit of 
this  argument,  we  use  proxies  for  these  from  the  World  Bank  dataset.  Accordingly,  our 





•   is the percent of labor force with secondary education 
•   is the compound annual growth rate of population over the period 
 
Adding two variables significantly decreases the number of observations we have, 
because values for these variables are missing for many countries. Furthermore, there could 
be  systematic  reasons  why  values  exist  for  certain  countries  but  not  for  others.  For this 
reason, we must accept that our conclusions could be biased. Hence, Model I is likely more 
reliable than Model II. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that any relationship between 
manufacturing and growth rate would hold if we controlled for these variables, since these 
variables are relevant to growth. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that since we are defining growth in terms of per capita GDP, we don’t need to control for population. 
5 See Figure III3 of appendix for regression results. 
6 See Figure IV of appendix for regression results. 
7 See Figure V of appendix for regression results. 10 
 
As with Model I, we tested Model II with 1996 and 1998 as our starting years as well 
as  for  an  average  of  the  years.
8  Our  results  varied,  and  only  one  model  (1998)  had  a 
statistically significant beta on manshare.The 1998 and average models had a positive beta, 
and the 1996 model had a negative beta. Because the significance and betas clearly depend on 
the starting year we choose, we are hard-pressed to argue that manshare is crucial to an 
economy. 





2.  Does Manufacturing Share of GDP Propel Economic Growth?: 
A Sample of Developed Countries 
 
In this part, we show that in 10 major developed countries, the relationship between 
manufacturing share of employment and forward per capita GDP growth rate
9 is no longer 
positive.
10 Tracking the correlation between the countries’ 10 year forward per capita GDP 
growth rate and share of manufacturing in employment reveals that although having more of 
a workforce in manufacturing may have aided GDP growth in the past, we should be wary of 
claims that it does today. 
 
2. 1 Data 
                                                 
8 See Figures VI, VII and VIII of appendix for regression details. 
9 In order to diminish the impact of business cycle fluctuations, a 10 year forward geometric average per capita 
growth rate was chosen.  
10  Manufacturing  share  of  employment  data  is  from  United  States  Department  of  Labor  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics.  Per  capita  GDP  data  is  from  the  United  Nations  Statistics  Division’s  National  Accounts  Main 
Aggregates database. Per capita GDP is measured in current USD. 11 
 
  Our  manufacturing  share  of  labour  data  comes  from  the  United  States  Bureau  of 
Labor Statistics’ Annual Labor force statistics for the years 1970-2009. This particular data 
set  only  had  data  for  ten  developed  countries,  so  we  confine  our  analysis  to  these  ten 
countries.  The  countries  which  we  study  are  Australia,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We chose this 
data set because it was contained data for a relatively long period of time (compared with 
other  available  data  sets),  and  had  relatively  few  missing  values:  the  data  for the  US  is 
missing for year 1970 and for Sweden is missing for the years 1970-1973. 
 
  We take the GDP data again from the United Nations National Account Aggregates 
database. The GDP data covers a time period between 1970 and 2009. GDP is specified in 
2009 US dollars. We chose this data set because it contains no missing values, whereas other 
GDP datasets had many missing values. 
 
2.2 Analysis 
   
  For each country in our study, we calculated 10-year forward geometric growth rates 
for per capita GDP for each year from 1970 to 1999. The year 1999 was the most recent year 
for which 10-year growth rates could  be calculated. Then  for each  year, a cross-country 
regression was performed by predicting the 10-year growth rate based on the manufacturing 
share of employment in the start of the 10-year period. Each regression contained 10 data 
pairs corresponding to the 10 countries in the study.
11 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between 10 year per capita forward growth rate and share of 
employment in manufacturing 
                                                 
11 These countries were chosen because they are the ten countries for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics 





Regression slopes and correlations for each year between 1970 and 1999 were plotted 
over time, revealing an interesting temporal change in the cross-country relationship between 
share of labour in manufacturing and future per capita GDP growth.  
 
Figure 4. Cross-country correlation between per capita GDP growth and share of 





Whereas relatively strong positive correlations were observed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the trend reverses and turns negative between 1991 and 1993. Out of these ten countries, the 
countries with more manufacturing share of employment (the US, Japan, Italy) grew more in 
the 1970s. But today, developed countries with more manufacturing share of employment 
grow less over ten years.  
 
Figure 5. Cross-country regression slope between per capita GDP growth and share of 






This has important implications for countries like the United States, where there is an 
ongoing debate over the value of protectionism in manufacturing to the economy. Politicians 
are reluctant to reduce trade barriers protecting the manufacturing sector for fear of economic 
troubles.  Authors  like  Ian  Fletcher  (2009)  tout  “successful  protectionism  and  industrial 
policy” as the road to economic prosperity.
12 
 
In  figure  6,  the  black  diamond  represents  the  United  States,  whose  share  of 
employment  in  1999  was  17.7%.  The  10-year  forward  geometric  per  capita  growth  rate 
starting in 1999 was 3.22%. That it is below the trend line suggests that its ten year per capita 
average GDP growth rate was low for its share of manufacturing employment compared with 
the other 9 developed countries we studied.  
 
Figure 6. Zooming in on 1999 
                                                 
12 Not everybody agrees that such strategies would work for a country like the United States. Delong and Ripoll 
(2005) showed that for relatively richer countries, the relationship between high tariff barriers and economic 
growth is negative, but for relatively poorer countries, the relationship is negative. This implies that at a certain 





3. Does Effective Governance Promote Manufacturing? 
 
Our results raise two questions. First, has manufacturing been replaced by services in 
developed countries? If so, what are the implications? We urge more research to be done on 
this,  to  clarify  what  types  of  economic  activity  are  relevant  to  economic  growth.  If 
manufacturing has been replaced by services, then what role does outsourcing play in this 
transition?  What  happens  when  developing  countries  have  nobody  to  outsource  their 
manufacturing to? 
 
  Second, what can be done to strengthen a country’s manufacturing base? Preliminary 
analysis of government effectiveness on manufacturing value added share of GDP indicates 
that  government  effectiveness  could  be  an  important  determinant of  manufacturing  value 
added share of GDP. It is likely that bad governance impinges on manufacturing more than 
services, since companies are scared to build up a capital stock that may be captured by 
crooks, so improving governance could help strengthen a manufacturing base (Grabowski 
and Mueller, 1972). 
 
This can be seen through a very simple regression of our World Bank government 
effectiveness point estimator (from above) on manufacturing value added share of GDP in 











  Note how the very best governance (above 1.5) corresponds to a manufacturing value 
added share of GDP mostly greater than 10%, whereas the worst (below -1.25) corresponds 
to  a  manufacturing  value  added  share  of  GDP  mostly  less  than  10%.  A  regression  of 
manufacturing  value  added  share  of  GDP  in  1996  on  government  effectiveness  for  146 
countries in 1996 was significant at the .5% level.
13 Note also that the regression line rises 
from a manufacturing share of 12% for the worst governed countries to 19% for the best 
governed ones. 
 
4. Some Reflections on The Economist’s Bhagwati-Chang Debate 
 
In closing we return to some of the issues raised in the Bhagwati-Chang debate on the 
importance of manufacturing. We looked for a plea for subsidies to manufacturing or for 
manufacturing protectionism through all 103 pages of the debate. No one made such a plea 
explicitly.  However,  we  are  not  clear  whether  the  pro  forces  are  implicitly  justifying 
subsidizing manufacturing. Moreover, Bhagwati refers to “the revival in the public domain of 
the view that therefore manufactures must be supported.” 
He also makes the classic point: 
                                                 
13 See appendix Figure IX for regression details. 17 
 
“..  if  the  returns  to  better  technology  accrue  to  the  firm,  there  is  no  reason  to 
subsidise: one needs to establish an externality to advocate a subsidy. (Bhagwati).” 
 
We argue,  furthermore, that even  if  subsidies are desirable to correct externality  nothing 
should be subsidized until there is a consensus methodology of how to determine optimal 
subsidies.  And the objective should be global welfare, not national welfare, with transfer 
payments handling the distribution of welfare between countries. All this is a preposterously 
tall  order,  especially  since  we  can  think  of  many  interventions  which  do  not  even  serve 
national welfare.  
Sir Geffrey Owen (London School of Economics) in his comment on the debate (as part of 
the interchange hosted by The Economist writes:  
“There are plenty of things the government can do to improve the supply side of the 
economy, but trying to alter the balance between manufacturing and services is not 
one of them.” 
He adds  
“Past  experience  in  Europe  suggests  that  attempts  by  governments  to  alter  the 
structure of their economies  by  favouring one sector over another generally cause 
more  problems  than  they  solve.  The  effect  in  many  cases  has  been  to  preserve 
uncompetitive businesses, often at great cost to the taxpayer, and to slow down the 
redeployment of resources into areas where they can be put to better use.” 
 
“Countries should specialize in what they are best at. One of the weaknesses in British 
industrial policy  in the 1960s and 1970s was the reluctance to accept that Britain 
could  not  expect  to  compete  against  America  in  all  the  major  high-technology 
industries; for example, a great deal of effort was wasted in trying to create a national 
champion in computers that could hold its own against IBM. Similarly, today many 
people envy Germany's manufacturing strength and look for ways of emulating it. But 
for a mixture of historical and institutional reasons Britain's competitive advantage 
lies in different areas, some of which are outside manufacturing—financial services, 
business and professional services, creative industries and the like.” 
In one of our favorite articles, Paul Krugman (1993) writes: 
“Now  there  are  reasons,  such  as  external  economies,  why  a  preference  for  some 
industries over others may be justified.  But this would be true in a closed economy, 
too.   Students  need  to  understand  that  the  growth  of  world  trade  provides  no 
additional support for the proposition that our government should become an active 
friend to domestic industry.” (p. 124) 
Finally, to the extent that a small share of manufacturing in an economy is a marker 
for business-hostile economic policies, we agree that a larger share of manufacturing predicts 
economic  success.  So  in  that  sense  one  can  vote  for  the  proposition  without  being  a 








  In Part 1, we saw that the protectionist assumption that manufacturing is crucial to an 
economy is not unambiguously supported by the data. Moreover, even when we control for 
various variables relative to growth, we find no definitive evidence for a relationship. In Part 
2, we saw that the manufacturing sector is not as crucial to developed countries’ per capita 
economic growth as it was in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and thus we need to be careful not to 
overstate the value of employment in manufacturing to a country’s per capita GDP growth. 
Just as the role of agriculture in the French economy changed in the eighteenth century due to 
economic development, the role of  manufacturing  in developed economies today  may  be 
changing.  In  Part  3,  we  found  that  effective  governance  is  positively  related  to  a  high 
manufacturing  share.  We  interpret  this  as  supporting  the  idea  that  effective  governance 
creates  an  economy  in  which  firms  feel  safe  to  build  up  their  capital  stocks,  and  this 
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